example of this is, of course, the Turkish legal reforms of the 1920s. Most other Muslim countries have in fact done the same thing in many areas, usually excepting the more "sensitive" areas relating to family life, such as marriage, divorce, inheritance, etc. This, too, is secularism insofar as it establishes substantial areas where the ShariCa does not apply, although the line between the "religious" and the "secular" is drawn in a different place from where it is drawn in the West.
We may discern two major sets of motives to which the first two different types of moderate secularism to some extent correspond. The first set involves a concern for "progress" and national strength, which, when allied with the conviction that the way to achieve these is to follow an essentially Western model, leads to "neutral" secularism of the Turkish type.15 The other motive is a concern for national unity where there is a significant non-Muslim minority. In Indonesia, with its Christians and Balinese Hindus, "divinity" is affirmed but not a specific kind of divinity, as noted above. In Egypt, with a significant Coptic minority, political rhetoric often speaks of "religion" rather than "Islam."16 Of course, in Egypt and Indonesia the concern for "progress" and national strength is also present. 1
To speak of secularism as "separation" of religion from public life is misleading, however, since Muslim secularism has not involved a separation of "mosque" and state on the pattern of the American separation of church and state. Secularist governments both support and control religious teaching and institutions to a considerable degree. Essentially, secularism has meant state control of religion and state effort to use religion in the service of its nationalist and developmental goals.l8 Furthermore, particularly in its nationalist form, secularism is by no means inconsistent with an appreciation of Islam as cultural heritage, and may even see it as a necessary component of the national identity. No one is considered a "Turk" who is not also a Muslim,'9 while Shi'ism was an important element in the Iranian identity pushed by the late Shah.20 Likewise, Arab nationalists, whether Christian or Muslim, have emphasized the role of Muhammad and his companions as Arab national heroes.21 What makes all of these secular is the subordination of Islam to national identity and the tendency to view the Islamic heritage as a human cultural achievement rather than a response to Divine initiative.
Likewise, Pan-Islamism may be secularist, insofar as it means loyalty to and/or feeling for Muslim peoples, but does not call on them to rule themselves by the Shari'a. Since Pan-Islamism is also consistent with Islamic modernism and radical Islamism, it can provide an ideological basis for cooperation among adherents of these types, in spite of their major differences.
It is important to stress that moderate secularism is not necessarily "irreligious." A secularist may perform faithfully all of the Islamic rituals and follow an Islamic code of ethics in his or her personal life. They may be actively concerned with da'wa, whether in the sense of calling Muslims to more faithful ritual and ethical practice or non-Muslims to Islam. They may actively promote Muslim charitable organizations and the like. Secularists may also, quite consistently, view religion as a desirable or even necessary support for personal ethics and, thus, for public order and well-being. They may hold the common idea that religion is necessary for the cultivation of the feelings, as distinct from reason. 22 In fact, under certain circumstances, secularist styles and rhetoric may be highly Islamic. Ataturk resisted the Greeks under Islamic colors and even received the Islamic title "Ghazi" for his efforts. Having established such Islamic "credentials" was undoubtedly another condition of his later success in "reforming" Islam. On similar grounds, I suspect that close analysis would lead us to consider Colonel Qaddafi a secularist, for all his "fundamentalist" rhetoric.23 These considerations mean that to the extent that Islamic "resurgence" involves increased devotional practice, concern with cultural heritage and Pan-Islamic feeling, it can be expressed within a secularist framework.
ISLAMIC MODERNISM
In formal contrast to secularism, Islamic modernism24 insists that Islam does provide an adequate ideological base for public life. The Egyptian statesman, Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam, whose book, The Eternal Message of Muhammad, may be taken as representative of this orientation, states
The difference between Islam and most other religions is that it did not content itself with merely establishing acts of worship and abandon the needs of society to a Caesar or any form of temporal governing body. Rather, Islam established ways of conduct, relationships, and rights and obligations for the individual vis-h-vis members of his family and the nation and for the nation vis-h-vis other nations.25
The 1973 constitution of Pakistan, likewise modernist26 in my view, asserts that "sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone" and that the authority of the people is a "sacred trust" exercised "within the limits prescribed by Him" (Preamble). This Islamist position is, however, qualified by a very strong tendency to emphasize the flexibility of Islam in the public sphere and to use this flexibility to interpret Islam in terms congruent with, or at least in very positive dialogue with, one or more Western ideologies. Among Sunnis this commonly includes the insistence that the "gate of ijtihad" be reopened, that Muslims not rely on the "medieval synthesis" represented by the four schools of jurisprudence (madhahib) but that they go back directly to the Qur'an and the Sunna to seek a fresh interpretation and synthesis for modern times, and also, of course, that "superstitions" derived from local pre-Islamic cultures be eliminated. 'Azzam says:
When we look at the Scripture, the Sunnah, and Muslim history in the days of the Rightly-Guided Caliphs, we find that Islam is definite and conclusive on all general principles suitable for all times, places, and peoples. When it comes to implementing these principles, one can see clearly the flexibility of the Islamic Shari'a and the authority it gives to our reason and our ijtihad. The Shari'a in effect upholds the guidance given by the Prophet when he said, "You know best about your earthly matters." Thus there is wide scope for human opinion and it is up to reason and experience to distinguish correct from incorrect action, to show the road to the general welfare and to steer clear of harm.27
The latter part of this quote may appear to be virtually a justification for secularism and, in fact, some Islamic modernism comes very close to this. Furthermore, cAzzam's "general principles," which include justice, freedom, brotherhood of man, the value of work, religious tolerance, and the redistribution of excess wealth,28 sound very Western, as does the order envisaged by the Pakistan constitution, "wherein the principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed" (Preamble). Modernists may also insist that Islamic social principles are capable of development and able to "keep up with the times."29 The crucial point, however, is that, unlike the secularists, the modernists are at pains to justify the general principles and the developments in terms of the Qur'an and the Sunna.
As suggested earlier, legal reform in the "sensitive" areas of family-related law has commonly been done in a more modernist than secularist way, although to the extent that it has been justified by traditional legal devices rather than an open exercise of absolute ijtihad,30 it moves in a traditionalist direction.
Modernism achieves flexibility in three main ways. The first is by the tendency to restrict the specific and detailed content of the authoritative tradition as much as possible by limiting it to the Qur'an and the authentic Sunna and then possibly limiting the latter by a radical Hadith criticism.31 This does not mean that the later tradition is necessarily ignored, but the tendency is to use it selectively. A few, such as Parwez in Pakistan, would go even further and treat only the Qur'an as absolutely binding.32 Still more radical is the teaching of Mahmud Muhammad Taha, the recently executed leader of the Republican Brothers in the Sudan, who would restrict it to the Meccan part of the Qur'an.33 Open advocacy of these more radical approaches is rare, however.
The second way is a more or less radical (re)interpretation34 of the authoritative sources. This is particularly the case with the Qur'anic texts on polygyny, the hadd punishments, jihad, and the treatment of unbelievers,35 which appear to conflict with "modern" views. In some cases modernist (re)interpretation can find considerable support in the text, such as the requirement of four witnesses to adultery,36 which may have the effect of voiding the hadd in practice, or the well-known argument that the Qur'anic permission of four wives is conditioned on the ability of the husband to treat them fairly, which ability is denied by another passage.37 A more subtle form of this argument is that the Qur'an at the legal level limited the number of wives to four but affirmed monogamy as an ideal toward which the community should strive.38 This underlines the flexibility of the Shari'a, which allows polygymy since circumstances sometimes require it but provides a clear impetus toward monogamy. The modernist tendency has been to interpret jihad as defensive war and to stress the texts that call for tolerance of non-Muslims.39 In some cases modernist (re)interpretation in these and other areas may avail itself of traditional fiqh doctrines, although to the extent that it does so, it may move in a traditionalist direction.
(Re)interpretation in its extreme form would lead to the "neo-modernism" proposed by Fazlur Rahman, in which all the specific cases in the Qur'an and the Sunna would be in effect converted into moral principles. The specific cases would be studied in the light of their context to see what moral principles they exemplify, and it is these principles that would be considered authoritative.40
The third way is an apologetic which links aspects of the Islamic tradition with Western ideas and practices, and may claim that the Western practices in question were originally derived from Islam. This may be a simple identification, as, for example, the Nasserist writer who defends the adaption of Yugoslavian "direct democracy" in Egypt on the grounds that "This recent concept of 'direct democracy' is not original. It was to be found in early Islamic democracy."41 More subtly, the claim may be that the Western practice represents the best way to carry out the traditional Islamic injunction under modern conditions. Ahmad Bahgat says of the Qur'anic injunction to the ruler to consult others (shura): "Shura in modern political terminology is democracy. Modernist apologetic has been severely criticized by many scholars as superficial, tendentious, and even psychologically destructive,45 so much so that the term "apologetics" has almost become a term of abuse in the literature on modern Islam. Apologetics as such, however, is not necessarily bad. Indeed, it must feature in any religion that would defend itself at the bar of reason or recommend itself to outsiders. If modernist apologetics are open in practice to such criticism, its failings are not inherent in the type, but result rather from the difficult psychological position in which modern Muslims have found themselves. Although it may seem at times that apologetic modernism is little more than a cover for what secularists do more openly, it at least allows Islam to act as a principle of selection among competing Western ideologies. This is undoubtedly one reason why ideologies such as nationalism and socialism find more ready reception among Muslims than Marxism or fascism. It will also tend subtly to Islamicize any ideology or practice adopted. To call democracy shura, for example, will encourage an interpretation of the concept in the direction of the traditional Islamic practice of shura, especially in the minds of those who do not speak a Western language.
Modernist ideologies will, of course, vary depending on which of these three ways are most prominent in a given case and which Western models are followed. Thus, one may speak of an "apologetic" modernism which relies heavily on the less subtle forms of "identification," and a "(re)interpretive modernism," which seeks to avoid this. One may, likewise, speak of a "liberal-nationalist" modernism, a "socialist" modernism (such as "Islamic Socialism"), or a "third-world radical" or "post-Marxist revolutionary" modernism (e.g., the Shah's "Islamic Marxism"). Like modernists, but even more insistently, radical Islamists claim that Islam is for all aspects of social as well as personal life. They agree with the modernists that Islam is flexible and that un-Islamic "superstitions" must be eliminated. They also accept the need for absolute ijtihad, but they are likely to grant it less scope and they emphasize that it must be done in an authentically Islamic way and not as a covert means of copying the West. Mawdudi says, "The purpose and object of ijtihad is not to replace the Divine law by man-made law. Its real object is to understand the Supreme Law."48 Sayyid Qutb says that Islam is "flexible" but not "fluid"49 and stresses that "if there is an authoritative text (nass), then that text is decisive and there is no scope for ijtihad. If there is no nass, then comes the time for ijtihad, in accordance with the established principles of God's own method."50 Consistently with this, radical Islamists tend to accept more of the past ijtihad of the scholars and to emphasize somewhat less the failings of the community in pre-modern times and somewhat more the distortions caused by Western colonialism.5' They also strongly emphasize the distinctiveness of Islam. Mawdudi objects to those who wish to identify Islam with "democracy," "communism," or "dictatorship" on the grounds that such identifications result from "the belief that we as Muslims can earn no honour or respect unless we are able to show that our religion resembles modern creeds."52 They tend to reject terms like "Islamic socialism," and Khomeini even refused to include the word "democratic" in the name of the Islamic Republic of Iran.53 By contrast, the Mujahidin-i Khalq, for example, do speak of the "Democratic Islamic Republic of Iran." This concern for distinctiveness may manifest itself in an insistence on clearly distinctive Islamic laws, such as the hadd penalties. More subtly, though, distinctiveness is achieved by emphasizing that Islam as a whole is a distinct and integrated system, so that even if individual elements do not seem distinctive, their place in the Islamic system makes them different.54 Consistently with this approach, some say that punishments like cutting off the hand of a thief should be carried on only after a truly Islamic society is established.55
In accord with this concern for authenticity and distinctiveness, radical Islamists place less emphasis on apologetics. In practice this may be only a difference of degree, but in intention it is more than that. Both Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb see an "inferiority complex" in modernist apologetics.56 Notably, they tend to be uncompromising on the question of non-Muslim minorities.
Mawdudi openly attacks "equality before the law" as a sham and defends the Islamic provision for dhimmi status.5
More than others, the radical Islamists emphasize the urgency of putting the Shari'a into practice. It is not only an ideal to be known and revered, but a law to be put into effect and obeyed. This, in fact, is the main burden of Khomeini's lectures on Islamic Government.58 At this point, though, there are significant variations of strategy. Some are more willing to accept a gradualist approach to Islamic legislation and to cooperate with those of other ideological persuasion. In Egypt in 1984, some Muslim Brothers were elected to parliament as members of the Wafd, the leading secularist party of the pre-Nasser era. Other radical Islamists are more oriented toward violent or revolutionary action, as in the Iranian revolution or the assassination of Anwar Sadat. These may accuse the former type of "selling out."59
In spite of its conscious stress on authenticity, however, radical Islamism is still very modern and accepts much that is borrowed from the West. In some ways this is hardly surprising since it arose primarily as a reaction against Westernizing trends, and reactions commonly take on some of the characteristics of what they react against. Most obviously, it has no difficulty accepting modern material technology, as the role of the cassette tape recorder in the Iranian revolution and the clash of modern weapons in the Iran-Iraq war dramatically illustrate. This does not compromise its authenticity since classical Islamic civilization had little problem borrowing purely material technology. In fact, the hadith quoted above by 'Azzam ("You know best about your earthly matters") refers in context to the pollination of date palms, a matter of agricultural technology. Beyond this, however, radical Islamists have been able to accept and use effectively many modern methods of political and social organization that are of Western provenance and to adapt at least some Western political ideas and symbols. The Islamic Republic of Iran has political parties, elections, and a parliament, and its "Crusade for Construction" (Jihad-i Sazandegi) is at least distantly reminiscent of the U.S. Domestic Peace Corps. The youth organizations and cooperatives developed by the Muslim Brothers in Egypt afford another example. In the realm of ideological concepts, Khomeini may have rejected "democratic" but he accepted "republic," and the ability of the Iranian leaders to use populist and third world revolutionary rhetoric is well known. Mawdudi says that "Muslim is the title of that International Revolutionary Party organized by Islam" and that jihad refers to "revolutionary struggle,"60 while Sayyid Qutb speaks in a similar context of a "vanguard,"6' and describes Islam as "a universal proclamation of the liberation of man."62 Although radical Islamists try to avoid following Western models, these models do undoubtedly exercise some influence on them and lead to some variation among them. Thus Mawdudi is sometimes said to be more "capitalist" and Sayyid Qutb more "socialist," and similar differences have apparently surfaced in Iran. Still, the variations within this type are less than within any of the others.63
Particularly important is the fact that radical Islamists accept the idea of progress. With their zeal for following the Sunna of the Prophet, they are commonly accused of wanting to turn the clock back to seventh century Arabia, but this is a serious misapprehension. They not only want progress but insist that Islam is the way to get it. Khomeini, for example, describes Islam as "progressive,"64 and Mawdudi says, "we can accelerate the onward march to progress only on the strength of the moral values enunciated by Islam."65 In fact, far from reflecting a rejection of the idea of progress, their zeal reflects an acceptance of it, since the idea of progress cuts the ground out from under one of the most common traditional justifications for inaction, the view that historical decline is more or less inevitable so that the ideal of the "golden age" of the Prophet cannot be realized in later times.66 Radical Islamists undoubtedly want to undo many of the effects of Western-style "progress," but this is not the same as wanting to turn the clock back.
The social and political activism of radical Islamists also bespeaks a much more worldly orientation than has been usual among pious Muslims in the past, and they are strikingly characterized by what Weber called "inner worldly asceticism." This must be kept in perspective, though. They are not unconcerned for otherworldly things, and to some extent their emphasis on this-worldly things is a function of the fact that it is mainly in the this-worldly sphere that secularism has called Islam into question. The ability of Shi'i radical Islamism, in particular, to combine otherworldly concern with this-worldly action in martyrdom has been dramatically demonstrated on the city streets and on the battlefield.
We may note in passing two other "Protestant" tendencies of radical Islamism. One is a clear tendency to urge a "Weberian" work ethic, and the other is a tendency to "simplify" the Islamic symbol system67 by concentrating on certain basic elements. Both of these it shares with Islamic modernism, but in the latter case the motivation is different. Whereas modernism simplifies the symbol system in the interests of "flexibility," radical Islamism does so more in the interests of authenticity. Seeing the basics as under threat, it wishes to reinforce them and relate everything more firmly to them. In fact, its long-range tendency may be more to "rationalize" than to simplify the symbol system. Its tendency to view Islam as a "system" is also modern, I think.68 Traditionally, the political provisions of the ShariCa were understood as commands incumbent on the ruler rather than as a "system" in the usual sense of the term.69 Related to this is their strong tendency to "reify" Islam, which W. C. Smith has argued is a modern phenomenon, although with roots in the past.70
The "modernity" of radical Islamism is related to the fact that in the Sunni world radical Islamists have tended to be "laymen,"71 and thus probably not so fully aware as the ulama of the complexity and resources of the past tradition. Among Shi'is, on the other hand, it has been led by the ulama, partly because the "gate of ijtihad" was not closed among Shi'is. This may have made ShiCi ulama a bit more flexible in interpretation, but more importantly it has given them more authority over their followers and allowed them to maintain much greater independence of Westernizing governments than was possible for their Sunni counterparts. The fact that Shi'i radical Islamism is ulama-led means that it has a greater rootage in the past tradition and tends in a somewhat "neotraditionalist" direction.
Apart from the area of material technology, it is often hard to say whether "borrowing" is the best way of describing the relationship of radical Islamism to Western ideas and practices. In many cases it would be more accurate to say that it develops certain aspects of the basic Islamic symbol system in certain ways in response to the Western challenge. In either case, of course, the effect of the modern West is extremely significant and often decisive. In both cases, also, Islamic modernism has played an important mediating role, to the extent that radical Islamism has accepted its "borrowings" or its interpretations.72 The conscious concern of the radical Islamist, however, is that where there is borrowing it be controlled by the Islamic symbol system. Particularly with ideological symbols, it is important that they have a clear Islamic rootage.73 We might say that the radical Islamist in a secularist country is like a person who has grown up in a house whose structure he does not like and who would like to take it over and demolish it and rebuild it to a different plan, but is quite willing to use some of the old materials in the process. In Iran the process has begun.
THE SCALE OF "ISLAMIC TOTALISM"
As indicated earlier, the three orientations so far discussed vary primarily along the scale I have labeled "Islamic totalism," that is, the degree to which Islam is accepted as the guide to social action and public legislation. At the extreme "left" of radical secularism, Islam is totally rejected even as "religion," somewhat to the right of this it is accepted as "religion" but rejected as the guide to public life, while at the extreme right of radical Islamism, it is insisted upon as both "religion" and ideology. In between, there is some effort to have it both ways.
If we were to locate the constitutions of several Muslim countries along this spectrum, we might come up with the following order from left to right: Albania (radical secularist), Turkey (neutral secularist), Indonesia (religious secularist), Syria, Iraq, Egypt (Muslim secularist), Pakistan (Islamic modernist), Iran (between radical Islamist and Islamic modernist). When the Egyptian constitution was amended in 1980 to make the principles of the Shari'a "the primary source" rather than "primary sources" of legislation, this represented a slight shift to the right; but it is still closer to the secularist type, since the principles of the Shari'a are still not the only source and it is still presumably "the people" who have the authority to determine when they will and will not be followed.
On the scale of modernity, these three types are fairly close, but there is some difference since radical Islamism would be less willing to sacrifice elements of Islam to the needs of "modernity." For example, they would certainly not be willing to modify the fast of Ramadan in the interests of development, as Bourgiba wanted to.
The discussion so far has drawn mainly on the areas of political ideology and legal reform. The same typology, however, could be applied to other areas. For example, I view the current movement for "interest-free" banking as radical Islamist. The secularist position would be, of course, that economics and religion are separate. A capitalist oriented modernism might justify modern interest by arguing that the Qur'anic term riba does not really apply to modern banking practices,74 while a socialist oriented modernism might generalize the prohibition into an attack on capitalist economic injustice.75 The radical Islamist position represents a reaffirmation and in some ways an intensification of the traditional prohibition and is prepared to restructure the banking system in a major way to accomplish this. The new female Islamic garb is radical Islamist insofar as it involves a traditional prescription but not the traditional styles. It is possible, obviously, for one to be modernist or secularist in some respects, for example, political ideology, and radical Islamist in others, for example, female garb.
TRADITIONALISM
A traditionalist may be defined as one whose allegiance is to what many would consider the particular "mix" of Shari'a and non-Shari'a elements characterizing his area on the eve of the Western impact, and who has not significantly internalized the Western challenge, that is, who has not felt the attraction as well as the threat of Western ways, and thus has not fully appreciated the depth of the threat. He will probably be more "otherworldly" than the types so far discussed and certainly more given to traditional "superstitions."
Traditionalists respond to the Western challenge strictly in terms of the paradigms offered by the tradition for coping with adversity. The Westerners may be kafirs to be resisted by force or to be tolerated as one of the punishments God visits upon his faithful for their sins or one of the trials by which He tests their faith.76 To some extent the Crusades and the Mongol invasions can offer historical precedents.77 Some have taken consolation in the thought that God may grant kafirs worldly success but reserves the bliss of paradise for the Muslims.78 Nevertheless, even the traditionalists are slightly "modern," insofar as they have had to make this much response. Those who have made no response at all we could call simply "traditional." In the nineteenth century and decreasingly in the twentieth, the traditionalist orientation has generally characterized the ulama and other traditional elites, the Sufi orders, and the lower classes, especially the peasants, except that many of these last, along with higher classes in areas such as central Arabia and Afghanistan were presumably traditional into the twentieth century.
We may discern a scale of traditionalism from "rejectionist" on the right to "adaptationist" on the left.79 The rejectionists would be those, particularly in the nineteenth century, who mounted revolts and resistance against the encroaching colonial powers, or violently resisted the reform efforts of the Westernizing Muslim rulers, but without significant efforts to reform the understanding of the Shari'a or to extend it in practice to areas of life where it had traditionally held less sway, or to assert its relevance to distinctively modern issues.
The adaptationists would be those who have gone along or at most used delaying tactics. Their actions make sense within the framework of a view that the times are inherently corrupt, due to the distance from the ideal time of the Prophet, and that necessity, therefore, makes such adaptation appropriate.80 They may in fact prefer to allow the ruler the traditional, but implicitly secularizing, expedient of removing certain classes of cases from ulama jurisdiction, than to allow Islamic modernist reformers to tamper with the ideal. It may be such an attitude that explains the opposition of the Azharis to the reforms of Muhammad 'Abduh and his followers.
Traditionalists have often been accused of a rigid conservatism (jumud), but such an accusation may be unfair. The tradition has always had its ways of gradually coping with change. Even if the gate of "absolute" ijtihad had been closed,81 ijtihad within the framework of tradition has always been possible. The traditionalists have been those who felt that the time-honored ways of change were adequate or, if they became rigid, did so in reaction to the modernizing pressures put upon them.
The most conservative elements in Saudi Arabia are best described, I think, as traditionalist, and certainly those who opposed the introduction of television, for example, were at the rejectionist extreme. The fact that Saudi Arabia does not even have a constitution, in the modern sense, argues for considering it traditionalist. Analysis of present thinking and practice in Saudi Arabia would, I think, uncover both modernist and radical Islamist, and perhaps even secularist tendencies, with modernist tendencies probably strongest in official circles.82 Those who took over the sanctuary in Mecca in 1979 may have been radical Islamists reacting against other trends, although "rejectionist neo-traditionalist" may be a better label.
NEO-TRADITIONALISM
When the traditionalist begins to come more deeply to grips with the Western challenge, he may become a "neo-traditionalist." Here, too, we may discern "rejectionist" and "adaptationist" extremes. Neo-traditionalism may be viewed as a transitional stage on the way to secularism, modernism, or radical Islamism, but it is also possible that it may generate more permanent and distinctive types.
The neo-traditionalist accepts the need for modern technology, but is likely to be more selective than the modern types in appropriating it, and likely to give it less symbolic, as distinct from functional, value.83 He is also likely to have internalized other Western ideas and values somewhat less, particularly the idea of progress and the "Weberian" work ethic. To the extent that he is less committed to the idea of progress, he may feel it less urgent that the Islamic ideal be translated at once into social practice, and, if he is of the adaptationist sort, he may feel that the traditional ways of coping with change are adequate in the long run though perhaps not in the short run and thus that it is better to have a temporary secularist gap between ideal and reality for a time than to have an overhasty modernist or radical Islamist tampering with the ideal. At the same time, he may feel it appropriate to use "obstructionist" tactics to slow down a secularist government's ill-considered rush to certain forms of modernity.84 He will prefer gradual to revolutionary change. The rejectionist neo-traditionalist, on the other hand, may feel the need for more revolutionary action but may derive the motivation for this more from traditional Mahdist ideas than from the modern idea of progress.85
The adaptationist neo-traditionalist may see positive value in local traditions qua local traditions, over against Western ways and also over against the more unitary Islamic model advocated by the radical Islamists. He is more likely than the other types to recognize that certain local customs are both non-Islamic in origin and non-"modern," and yet still value them. One of the leaders of the Nahdatul Ulama in Indonesia has criticized radical Islamism for its "rejection of the past adaptive ways of Islam as a religion 'living' in a concrete local tradition. "86
The neo-traditionalist is likely to value the depth and complexity of the past Islamic tradition as represented by the learning of the ulama and the wisdom of the Sufi sheikhs more than the more modern types. Thus, a case might be made for considering the Iranian revolution more rejectionist neo-traditionalist than radical Islamist, both because of the place of the ulama and because of its distinctively Shi'i and Iranian elements. In fact, I would be inclined to place it somewhere on the scale between the radical Islamist and rejectionist neotraditionalist types. The same may be true of some of the recent violent or potentially violent manifestations of Sunni "fundamentalism" in the Arab world.87 I believe that many of the ulama and members of Sufi orders in Egypt today are best seen as adaptationist neo-traditionalists.88 The Hamidiyya Shadhiliyya order, as described by Gilsenan, fits this type quite well.89 Ayatollah Shariatmadari in Iran could probably best be placed here. I believe that writers such as Sayyid Hossein Nasr and Martin Lings90 are best seen as neo-traditionalists, and this suggests that neo-traditionalism may be able to draw support from more recent Western doubts about aspects of "modernity," such as reservations about "progress" and the effects of technology on the environment.
THE TWO-DIMENSIONAL SPECTRUM
We can now fill out our spectrum and present it in its two dimensions (see Figure  1) . On the scale of "modernity," we have already seen some differences among the non-traditionalist types, but obviously it is on this scale especially that the traditionalist types vary from all of them, with pure traditionalism at the lowest point and neo-traditionalism intermediate. I see no reason for placing the rejectionist and adaptationist types of pure traditionalism any differently on this scale, but adaptationist neo-traditionalists will rank a bit higher than rejectionist neo-traditionalists for reasons like those that put secularists higher than radical Islamists. On the scale of "Islamic totalism" rejectionist traditionalism is considerably to the left of radical Islamism because of the many areas of life that even the "fundamentalist" forms of traditional Islam did not seek in practice to bring strictly under the sway of the Sharica. Probably rejectionist traditionalism should be placed even to the left of the strictest forms of Islamic modernism (whether in the "apologetic" or "neo-modernist" mode). The sides of the diagram are skewed to the right because I think rejectionist types have probably moved more quickly to the "right" on the Islamic totalism scale than "up" on the modernity scale, while positions corresponding to a strict secularism of even the moderate type have not been part of the traditionalist option. The term "fundamentalism" is sometimes used to refer to everything to the right of a line drawn vertically from rejectionist traditionalism to modernism, but if it were to be used at all, I would rather limit it to radical Islamism and rejectionist neotraditionalism (see Figure 1) , since these are the positions that have both the radicalness and the modernity that seem to me implicit in the term. In fact, however, this term seems to me a seriously misleading one and I would suggest that "Islamic radicalism" be used instead.9' It may be observed that the types will tend to show more ideological diversity within them the further they are from the extreme of radical Islamism in either direction. Secularism, in principle at least, can include a wide variety of Westernderived ideologies, while traditionalism will reflect the diversity of the traditional Islamic world. Radical Islamism should show the least diversity both because it most strictly insists on making "Islam" its ideology and because it tends to "simplify" that Islam and stress the widely shared basics. Still another aspect of secularism that cuts both ways is the fact that its constituency has been largely among the social, political, and economic elite. On one hand, this has meant that its adherents have been better positioned to put their beliefs into practice, but on the other hand, the weakness of secularism among the masses makes its position always somewhat insecure, and contributes to the sort of gap between the Westernized elite and the rest of society that exploded so dramatically in Iran.
A particular problem for secularism is its relatively weak roots in the Muslim past, although these are not totally absent. Some precedent for the separation of religion from other areas of life can be found in the fact that the Shari'a was spelled out in far more detail and far more regularly followed in areas of personal ritual and family matters than in other areas of public law. Particularly if secularism allows the areas of family law to be placed on the sacred side of the sacred-secular divide, it can be argued that secularism merely carries traditional practice a logical step further. In a similar way, equality before the law can find precedent in the high degree of tolerance given to non-Muslims in the periods of greatest Islamic cultural flourishings, such as CAbbasid Baghdad, Umayyad Spain, and Akbar's Mogul India; and nationalism certainly can find nourishment in ethnic feelings and local loyalties that have existed for centuries. On the other hand, down through the ages the most pious and committed Muslims have probably felt their ethnic identity less than others, certainly viewed the failure to enforce the ShariCa as a sign of corruption, and tended to be restive when rulers gave too much freedom and recognition to non-Muslims. In general, the elements in traditional Muslim practice upon which secularism can call for support are those that have been least well integrated into the central Islamic symbol system. In fact, a very major reinterpretation of Islam will be necessary before it can be congenial to secularism. A step in this direction is a reinterpretation of Islamic history that puts the relatively secular Umayyads in a much better light than pious Muslims have usually seen them, that emphasizes the secular elements in the CAbbasid period of glory, and deemphasizes the cultural (as distinct from more strictly "religious") significance of the early Medinan state and the Rightly Guided Caliphate;94 but I doubt if this is sufficient. Beyond this, it would be necessary to develop a secularist interpretation of the basic Islamic symbol system as found in the QurDan and the Sunna, both of which have a lot to say about public life. Reinterpretations of this magnitude needed are by no means unknown to the history of religion, and secularists sometimes point to the Protestant Reformation as a possible model.95 The best known effort is "Ali Abd al-Raziq's al-Islam wa-usul al-hukm, published in Cairo in 1925.96 The violent attacks to which the book and its author were subjected effectively stifled further public developments along this line in Egypt, and the climate today in the Muslim world seems even less conducive to such an effort.97
In the past, it has been Islamic symbols that have mobilized moral commitment in the Muslim world, and I do not think any secularist ideology has yet given a really convincing demonstration of its ability to do this in other terms. The Palestinians might be an exception to this point, but their situation is distinctive and even among them of late an increase in Islamism is reported. The record of secularism so far in providing a basis for development and social integration in the Muslim world is much poorer than was widely expected a generation ago, and it is not surprising that many are seeking an alternative. Secularism is currently on the defensive, but the vast majority of Muslims still live under secularist governments and these governments will not yield power easily.
By contrast, the strength of radical Islamism lies precisely in its claim to Islamic authenticity and its consequent ability to call forth commitment; radical Islamists are commonly respected by others for their sincerity and willingness for self-sacrifice if for nothing else. Since it combines this with many modern characteristics, it has an appeal to those who have been exposed to "modernity" in a major way, but still value tradition, and to those who may have experienced more of the disruption than the benefits of modernization. These include many young people and recent immigrants from the countryside to the city, groups undoubtedly crucial for the future of developing countries.
The fact that radical Islamism takes a position on the place of the ShariCa clearly and diametrically opposed to secularism and its tendency to be intolerant of other views allows it easily to be labeled "fanaticism" or "extremism," but also helps make it a suitable vehicle for movements of protest or revolution.
Perhaps the greatest long-run challenge for radical Islamism is the very size of the task to which its inner logic impels it. As already suggested, the undertaking implicit (and sometimes explicit) in it is to "dismantle" Western civilization and rebuild using many of its elements. The resulting society would be at least as different from present "free world" and communist societies as each of them are from the other, perhaps more so. Few radical Islamists, I think, realize the size of this undertaking.98 Whether this is possible in today's shrinking world in the face of the continued vitality of both the liberal and Marxist forms of Western civilization is not clear. On the other hand, the very size of the task may force radical Islamists to be more creative than either they or others expect. Their combination of a central concern for authenticity with a very real openness to change may well be the best recipe for a genuinely Islamic creativity. In fact, radical Islamists might conceivably generate changes in the Islamic symbol system of the magnitude, if not of the kind, that secularism needs. The doctrine of vilayat-i faqih in Iran today suggests such a possibility.99 If they should accomplish this, the implications could be no less earth-shaking than was the Protestant Reformation, which in many ways sought to "go back" but in fact released energies that impelled society forward. To realize this possibility, however, radical Islamism will have to show that it can elicit moral commitment not only for oppositional efforts but for constructive ones as well.l00
In short, radical Islamism has the strengths and weaknesses of any revolutionary ideology. Its power is great and the obstacles to it formidable; its potential for long run significance is probably greater than most observers are prepared to recognize.
Modernism may be said to attempt to combine Islamic authenticity with adherence to the "tried and proven" models for development drawn from the West. To the extent that it can do this, it can draw on traditional sources of moral commitment more effectively than secularism, while avoiding the disruption and "risk" involved in radical Islamism. On the other hand, it often involves a desire to "have one's cake and eat it too" and is apt to be used as a "cover" for essentially secularist programs. "Modernist" legislative reform has tended to be a matter of finding Islamic precedents for laws desired on essentially secularist grounds, rather than a serious reformulation of the tradition by absolute ijtihad.1?' To this extent, its claim to authenticity loses credibility.
The apologetic effort to interpret Islam in "Western" terms is not without significant basis, for Western and Islamic civilizations are historically affiliated and have much in common, and the West did in fact borrow much from the Muslims. This all too often, however, developed in a shallow and intellectually inadequate way. Modernist apologetic is particularly inadequate at the point where secularism has one of its greatest strengths, and radical Islamism is at least forthright, in the response to religious plurality. Despite its insistent proclamation of Islamic tolerance and its ability to adduce some impressive examples from past Muslim history, it rarely if ever comes to real grips with the fact that traditional dhimmi status is simply not the same as modern "equality before the law."'02 Hence, it is less than convincing to skeptical non-Muslim minorities. Unfortunately, the pressures of the modern situation make this sort of thing almost unavoidable. This issue is so sensitive that it is hard to allow the kind of frank public discussion that is necessary to arrive at less superficial positions.
It seems to me that Islamic modernism may play a useful role in easing some of the psychological and social strains of modernization by giving it a less alien face, but that it is unlikely to provide a really sound basis for social development in the long term unless it can develop the sort of radical reinterpretation proposed by Fazlur Rahman as "neo-modernism." There is undoubtedly an awareness of the need for this in some quarters, but whether the climate is much more ripe for it than for a "secularist" reinterpretation may be doubted. Short of this, modernism is likely to remain an essentially unstable stopgap or halfway house.
The distinctive strength of the traditionalist and neo-traditionalist positions is their rootage in the past tradition. Particularly insofar as they are members of the ulama, they are likely to have an awareness of and access to the riches of the past tradition that the more "modern" types often lack. Undoubtedly, pure traditionalism does not feel the Western challenge deeply enough to come up with an adequate response, but neo-traditionalism in some cases may feel the challenge sufficiently to respond while at the same time not being so "hung up" on the Western temptation-cum-threat as the more "modern" types. It may therefore be capable of a more balanced and critical assessment of the West in the long run. Adaptationist neo-traditionalism may provide the best framework for an evolutionary adaptation of the Islamic tradition to "modernity," while rejectionist neo-traditionalism may provide a revolutionary radical Islamism with the rootage it needs for long term survival, as may be happening in Iran.
What of the future? At present there is considerable "rightward" and perhaps some "downward" pressure everywhere, but also considerable resistance by the secularized elites. Further Islamic radical (i.e., radical Islamist or rejectionist neo-traditionalist) takeovers could happen in the near future but seem a bit less likely today than a few years ago. In the short term, I would expect secularist ideologies to maintain themselves, though with some "erosion" to the right. In the medium term, much will depend on the ability of the Iranian revolution to institutionalize itself and appeal to Muslims outside Iran. Assuming that it does so and "moderates" to some degree, one might foresee a -oriented (see fn. 9, below) . Thus, like Yvonne Haddad, he in effect divides the spectrum into three rather than four types. An important difference between his treatment and mine is that he is describing "styles of action" while I am describing "ideological orientations." One might say that a given "style of action" issues from or is congenial to a given "ideological orientation," but they are not identical. This may be why he classes as "fundamentalists" figures such as Qaddafi and Ali Shariati whom I will put elsewhere (cf. fn. 46 below). Another difference between our treatments is that his categories are intended to apply to the whole of Islamic history, while mine are designed specifically for the modern period. My "secularism" and "radical Islamism" could be considered as distinctively modern manifestations of his "adaptationism" and "fundamentalism" respectively. 
